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1Summary
Iceland has now become a player in the global tax competition. Many
questions have thus arisen regarding the international taxation environment.
Tax reductions were in fact more than in any other country in the year 2001,
where among other measures, the corporate tax rate in Iceland was lowered
from 30% to 18%. It has been maintained, that Icelandic Authorities are
completely independent in matters of taxation, without any regard to the
European Economic Area.
Iceland’s membership of the EEA ensures access to the EU´s single market.
As Europe has moved increasingly to a Single Market, companies have had
to organize their operation on a European scale. The competence of the area
of direct taxes does not fall under the jurisdiction of the European Union,
even if the indirect taxes, such as VAT (Value Added Tax) and excise taxes
are within the power sphere of the European Union. However, in Art. 56
EC, it is stipulated that the EU should abolish any obstacles that hinder free
flow of capital between MS. In order to meet these objectives, there have
been adopted directives by the Council., for example the Parent-Subsidiarity
Directive. The EC Directives on taxes are not included in the EEA Treaty.
The power of taxation ensures the sovereignty of the state, providing the
necessary public funds for the state to function. The question therefore
arises: How is the national power of taxation limited by the fundamental
freedoms and non-discrimination clauses of the EC Treaty?
The main interest of this thesis is establishing the status of Iceland as a tax
competitor. Generally speaking the concept “tax competition” can involve a
good or a bad form of tax competition, depending on the underlying aim of
the country in question.
Tax law does not make up part of the EEA Treaty - in principle. However,
there are consequences that arise on the basis of the fundamental freedoms
and competition, including State aid - this also applies with regard to the
autonomy of tax law of the  EEA Member States. The nature of these
consequences and the EU-EEA environment form the structure of this
thesis.
In my opinion the Code of Conduct does affect Iceland. The implication of
this statement is not the Code is applicable by itself as an instrument to
control the tax legislation in Iceland. Quite the opposite, the Code of
Conduct is not applicable in any way in Iceland, but the restraints that it puts
on taxation policy on the Member States, must have the effect of
strengthening Iceland’s position as a serious tax competitor. The conclusion
is that a corporate-friendly tax rate, a membership in the Internal Market,
without the pressure of the Code of Conduct rules and the Monetary Union
gives Iceland a good position in European tax competition. Finally it must
2be concluded, that the measures that the Icelandic Government has taken so
far, fall under the definition of “good” tax competition and not harmful tax
competition.
3Abbreviations
EFTA European Free Trade Association
GDP gross national product
ISK Icelandic kronas, the currency of Iceland
MNE Multi national entities
MS Member State
KPMG a Swiss non-operating association
41. Introduction
1.1 Purpose and outline
Globalization and the technological revolution have created many new
challenges for tax authorities. Among these challenges is harmful tax
competition, a concept that embraces tax practices which erode national tax
bases, distort trade, investment and the shift of tax burden to labor.1
As will be discussed later, Iceland has become a player in the global tax
competition, which raises several questions regarding this environment:
What are the constraints and the possibilities of tax competition – what does
it in fact entail? Is Iceland is completely free to design its´ tax system,
without any regard to the European Union? What the scope of the EEA
Agreement? Is tax competition acceptable in the EU? Does the Code of
Conduct have any influence on Iceland?
The title of this paper can be a little misleading. However, the Icelandic
perspective is the red thread through the paper and taxation and harmful tax
competition are discussed from that perspective.
The following figure shows the problem at hand – the assignment is making
it all fit together.
Figure 1.
Hopefully, this paper will give a clearer picture of the issue. The starting
point is an analysis of Iceland regarding the recent developments in matters
of taxation. A chapter on tax competition is next in line. A rather detailed
discussion on the EEA Agreement follows in chapter three, followed by an
outline of the institutions of the European Union.  Finally we come to the
subject of tax law in the European Economic Area, followed by a limited
                                                
1 Katsushima, Harmful Tax Competition, Editorial, Intertax, Volume 27, issue 11, Kluwer
Law International 1999, p. 396.
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5discussion on the Code of Conduct. The final chapter responds to previous
discussion, followed by a summary.
It is far from easy to locate the exact place for Iceland in the context of
European taxation as such, thereby establishing what, if any, of the acquis
communautaire is applicable and/or binding.
1.2 Limitations
Iceland is a member of EFTA and linked to the European Community by the
EEA Agreement. Iceland is also a member of the OECD, but despite a very
interesting discussion on harmful tax competition in the OECD countries,
this paper is not the forum for that discussion. I admit, that it could be seen
as a fault, not using the opportunity to compare and analyze the measures
made on the one hand the EU and the other the OECD in regards on harmful
tax competition, but my evaluation was that this would expand the subject at
hand too much and take it out of the EEA perspective, which is the main
focus of the following discussion.
It is however relevant to mention in this context, the following comment
made by a high official within the OECD; “Only the less talented pay taxes
anymore”2. This comment shows that harmful tax competition is not only
European, but a global issue. The OECD Report on harmful tax practices is
mentioned only in comparison in chapter 7 on the Code of Conduct.
This paper is limited to the issue of direct taxation, hardly mentioning the
subject of indirect taxation at all.
Furthermore are bilateral or multilateral tax treaties outside the scope of this
paper as well, even though some of the judgments of the European Court of
Justice may touch upon the subject alongside other issues.
Finally, the obvious must be stated, that the following discussion is very
limited and does not do justice to the vast and extensive subjects at hand.
                                                
2 So commented by Tommy Persson in class in International skatterett at the University of
Lund, in spring 2001
62. Iceland – background and
recent changes
2.1. General introduction
Iceland’s situation is in many ways unusual compared to most other
Western European countries. The Icelandic nations’ most radical cultural
and economic changes occurred in the 40s when British and later American
forces occupied the country, after a stable period for centuries. The
influence, by far more by the Americans, was enormous.
The structure and economy of the society had for centuries undergone rather
modest changes compared to other nations on the Western hemisphere, as
the industrial revolution had had a very limited effect on the economy of
this isolated nation. Followed by the vast amount of foreign currency and
cultural influence large structure changes happened to the society. People
moved in vast quantities from the countryside to the capital, Reykjavík, and
many received for the first time a regular salary, paid in money, for their
work.
After the Second World War, Iceland received higher amount of financial
assistance, the Marshall help, than any other nation in the world. In addition
to the high amount of currency that had flowed into the Icelandic economy
in relation to the British, and more further the American forces, this had a
revolutionary effect on the nation, which has in no other period witnessed
such fast and radical changes.
Due to this fact Iceland has without doubt received considerable influence
from the American culture - rather than European influence, in the latter half
of the 20th century. Certain political mainstreams have followed. The
Conservative Party is for example by far the largest party in the country,
usually with support from about 40% of registered voters. Socialists and
Social democrats hold only a fraction of the support that similar parties have
in most other Western-European countries. A liberal view of the officials’
role in the society is therefore more apparent in Iceland than its neighboring
countries.
Furthermore, Iceland has no official army and does not have to sponsor the
country’s defense. Contrary to paying a percentage of its’ income to
defenses; it has received a generous sum of money from the American
forces.
The Icelandic Prime Minister has stated, that he opposes EU membership
and furthermore there are indications, that membership will not be agreed
upon, as the fishery industry is too important for the economy to limit
Iceland’s sovereignty in this important area.
72.2. Taxation in Iceland
Partly because of the facts stated above, and partly because of the aim of
attracting capital, Iceland has become among those European countries,
which have the lowest income tax on business. Even more tax reductions
have occurred in Iceland last year. They were in fact more than in any other
country, 3 as established an annual research on business taxation, made by
the KPMG International Tax and Legal Center in January 2002.4
In 2001, the corporate tax rate in Iceland was lowered from 30% to 18%, as
of 1 January 2002.5 Other changes were made as well, such as a reduction of
the corporate net wealth tax, from 1.2 per cent to 0.6 per cent at the end of
2002.  Furthermore, The corporate net wealth surtax is to be abolished at the
end of 2002, as well as inflation accounting. Corporations were to be
authorized to keep their books and draw up their accounts in foreign
currency as of the same tax and finally, the social security tax was to
increase by 0.77 per cent as of 1 January 2003. In addition to this, there is a
reason to believe that the corporate tax rate will be lowered even more in the
near future.6
In the last few years, reforms have been enacted in the field of holding
company taxation. An important reform is the advance ruling system, which
can create guidelines concerning the computation of taxable income, in
relation to certain head office activities carried out in Iceland.7
As mentioned in the introduction, these changes have the effect of entering
Iceland into the area of tax competition.
The method of lowering the corporate tax brings to mind the actions of the
Irish Government, where the business taxation rate is substantially lower
than the aforementioned development in Iceland. In chapter 9, the situation
in Ireland and recent changes and changes and problems connected with
Irish taxing policy are shortly discussed.
                                                
3 http://www.kpmg.is  , the research was done in 68 countries, among those the 30 OECD
countries, to many countries in South America, as well as countries in Asia and in the South
Pacific.
4 KPMG, an international company, specializing in accounting and taxation matters
4 Quote the law in question – nb.
6 In The Economist, 14. April 2001, Mr. David Oddsson, Iceland´s  Prime Minister,
announced his goal to lower the corporate tax rate from 30% to 15%.
7 Valdimarsson, G., Iceland A Location for International Holding Companies?, European
taxation, June 2001, p. 227-228.
83. Tax competition
Tax competition is highly relevant for Iceland, with the recent changes of
the corporate tax rate that were discussed here before. This chapter is meant
to find out what the concept tax competition comprises.
Regarding the subject ahead, tax competition, to my knowledge, has not
been a big issue within EFTA and in fact until the nineties, the phenomenon
tax competition between sovereign states within the European Community
or globally, was not a matter of special concern or subject to an international
or Community regulation. Not until recently has tax competition become a
real concern of the Community. 8
3.1. Introduction
Commissioner Mario Monti made the following statement when he was
introducing the Commission’s proposal to set up a new permanent Taxation
Policy Group:
Taxation is an integral part of our lives. It is, of course, the
source of revenue from which the state provides its citizens with
public infrastructure and social benefits. Beyond this, tax
policies affect a number of social and economic objectives.
They have a vital role to play in the European Union in creating
the smoothly functioning Single Market that is essential for our
future prosperity. And they must also be viewed in the context
of the Community’s shared objectives of promoting
employment, stimulating enterprise and protecting the
environment.
... While fully supporting the principle that Community action is
only needed where measures cannot best be taken at a national
level, the Commission believes that closer and better
coordination is vital. This is also necessary to prevent the rapid
liberalization of trade and investment flows from further eroding
the effective sovereignty of MS in favor of the markets.
...We must also continue to pay attention to the threat of fiscal
erosion, an underlying concern that came up time and again
during the work of the High Level Group. Unfair or harmful
competition for tax revenues can erode certain tax bases,
resulting both in a loss of revenue and in the distortion of tax
systems.
These words capture the important elements behind historical developments
in the area of taxation within the European Union, among them measures
                                                
8 Santon, A. C., Point J of the Code of Conduct or the Primacy of Politics over
Administration, European taxation, September 2000
9taken by the Commission and other Community institutions, to counter
harmful tax competition.
3.2. Tax competition – does it exist?
An important starting point is to keep in mind, that the fiscal systems as a
whole are in competition, but not the isolated tax systems of competing
states, i.e. the pattern of revenue and expenditure.9
In a working paper from the European Parliament; Tax Co-ordination in the
European Union, European Parliament, a research was done on changes in
certain direct tax rates, in the years 1986-1997.
One of the conclusions was, that it was clear that tax competition had not
had the long-term effect of reducing tax bases, either within the EU or the
OECD. Surprisingly, the percentage of GDP taken in tax had shown a
steady tendency to rise. However, the increase in overall taxation over the
last few years was only marginal compared to the previous twenty, and
some EU countries even experienced a modest fall. In the working paper,
the possible conclusion was addressed, that tax competition has effectively
“capped” the tendency for taxes to rise in relatively high tax countries, and
produced a convergence within the EU. This conclusion goes against the
aforementioned speech made by Mario Monti in 1997.
Another conclusion in the working paper, was that the figures did not show
any recent tendency for direct taxes or social security contributions to rise
more markedly than taxes overall. However, there was over the period
1984-94 there a shift to taxes on labor from taxes on other production
factors in the EU as a whole, though this was not the case in all MS. It is a
fact, that falling rates of corporate taxes tend to confirm an average shift of
the tax burden from the “mobile” to the “immobile” tax base.
On the other hand, differing tax structures make for sharp variations in these
effects and as an example some countries like Denmark and the UK rely less
on direct social charges than countries like France. Many factors, among
them differing tax structures, may well explain why tax competition
classified as “harmful” by one MS is not considered to be so by another.”10
In a study of Chennels and Griffith11 on tax competition between countries,
the conclusion was that no findings supported the hypotheses that small
countries set lower taxes than large countries or that a difference in tax rates
                                                
9 Tax co-ordination, in the European Union, European Parliament, working paper,
Directorate- p. 74
10 Tax Co-ordination... p. 73
11 Chennels, L., Griffith, R., Taxing Profits in a Changing World. Institute of Fiscal Studies,
London. A study from 1997, calculating effective and implicit tax rates for the period 1979-
1994.
10
between small and large countries depended on mobility of capital. Other
surveys conclude that there is evidence for international tax competition. 12
3.3. “Good” or harmful tax competition
The concept “tax competition” is generally speaking referred to as the
improvement of a country’s national economy as compared to foreign
jurisdictions by lowering internal tax burden to increase the competitiveness
of domestic business or to attract foreign direct investments.
Tax competition can be both good and bad – i.e. harmful – depending on the
underlying aim of the country in question. Good tax competition can force
governments to maintain low levels of expenditure. This kind of tax
competition is meant to achieve fairness and neutrality in the tax systems,
leading to desirable changes in the tax structure, such as broadening of the
taxable base and lowering of tax rates.
Where the goal, on the other hand, is primarily to attract foreign direct
investments, this can result in a harmful tax competition. An example of
such harmful tax competition is a reduction of a corporate tax rate
applicable on income earned by foreign investors or a reduction of
withholding tax rates on outbound income distributions. The most
dangerous economic implication of harmful tax competition is the ultimate
erosion of the taxable base.13 There exists no general, comprehensive and
universally accepted definition of harmful tax competition. 14
One of the examples of unfair tax competition are tax incentives that are
designed to attract “footloose” investment, with the possible effect of
distorting economic behavior of consumers, workers or investors to
prejudice the fair working of the Single Market. The erosion of tax bases is
also an obvious possibility. 15
3.4. Harmful tax competition – when is it
harmful?
Competition between tax systems as a whole, can include the overall level
of taxation, the balance between direct, indirect and the general structure of
rates, as well as competition based on special arrangements for particular
                                                
12 Schjelderup, G., International Tax Competition: Is it Harmful, and if so, What are they
Policy Implications? The Globalisation Project, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
April 2002, p. 18.
13 Pinto, C., EU and OECD to Fight Harmful Tax Competition: Has the Right Path Been
Undertaken?, Intertax, Volume 26, Issue 12, 1998, p. 386-387.
14 Pinto, C., EU and OECD to Fight Harmful Tax Competition: Has the Right Path Been
Undertaken, Intertax, Volume 26, Issue 12, Kluwer Law International 1998, p. 394.
15 Tax co-ordination, p. 73
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activities or areas, or administrative features that have the effect of
distorting competition.
Whether competition between tax systems can be considered “fair/good” or
“unfair/harmful” is really a political question and the fact has to be taken
into account that all MS are democracies, which should be able to make
choices like relatively low tax levels or particular tax structures, even if the
result brings about a competitive advantage.
A very important fact is that the tax systems in isolation are not in
competition, but fiscal systems as a whole – that is, the pattern of both
revenue and expenditure. A good example is, that low corporate tax rates
may attract investment; but poor infrastructure and a poorly-educated
workforce may repel it.
If we take an example of two countries, A and B, that both have a general
level of taxation equal to 50% of their GDPs. Country A finances this
through high rates of indirect taxation, with relatively low rates of corporate
tax: country B in the reverse way. Tax competition exerts a downward
pressure on indirect tax rates in country A, and on corporate rates in country
B. This would result in:
A. Downward pressure on the overall tax level in both countries
B. Convergence of tax structures.16
3.5. Special tax arrangements
Special tax arrangements, rather than tax systems as a whole, are generally
what harmful or unfair tax competition refers to.
In the aforementioned working paper from the European Parliament; Tax
Co-ordination in the European Union, special tax arrangements are analyzed
as being of two kinds:
1. Tax arrangements, which distort competition as an incidental
consequence of their main purpose. The Commission has for
example highlighted the differences in the corporate tax base,
which result in a large number of marginal effective corporate tax
rates. These can vary by around 200%, depending on among other
industrial sector, mode of finance and category of investor and
can strongly influence the choice of tax jurisdiction in which
companies invest.
2. Tax arrangements being the primary purpose of which is to affect
competition. The most obvious example of the second category is
regional/State aid, which is distributed via preferential tax
                                                
16 Tax Co-ordination in the European Union, European Parliament, working paper,
Directorate- p. 74.
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arrangements. There is a continuing debate over State aids – this
subject will be touched upon later in this paper, with regards to
taxation. Preferential treatment for one geographical area is
obviously “unfair” to others. On the other hand, this is usually the
precise point of the policy. The creation of the euro area and the
need to limit the danger of “asymmetric shocks” within it will
possibly heighten this dilemma in the future17. Furthermore it can
also be argued that zero rates of withholding tax on interest paid
to non-residents are specifically intended to attract savings. The
Commission has referred to this as a factor both in the erosion of
MS´s tax bases and the misallocation of investment. However, in
this case the competition is not merely within the EU, but global.
3.6. Approximation of national tax law
The approximation of national tax law where the European Community has
legislative competences is also to be considered in this regard.18  Member
States still have veto in the area of direct taxes and thus it has never been
possible to establish international tax neutrality by harmonizing direct taxes.
A fundamental change has however occurred, as growing international tax
competition has the possibility to restrict the scope of fiscal action of a
single country. The Commission has therefore, since 1996, aimed at further
approximation of the tax systems of the MS. In a report from 199619, the
Commission distinguished between “loyal” and “harmful” tax measures.
The harmful or unfair tax competition have been identified by the OECD
Committee on Fiscal Affairs in their Guidelines20 and by the European
ministers of finance in the Code of Conduct for business.21
Despite the “benign” report of the European Parliament regarding tax co-
ordination in the EU, there seems to be a common consent among the MS
that an action at the Community level is needed to fight against harmful tax
competition. The reasons are the following:
a. the erosion of national tax bases through unfair tax competition
represents a threat to the tax revenues of the MS.
b. The competition can reduce fiscal revenue, which can lead to a shift
in the balance towards the labor force that leads to negative effects
on labor costs.
c. Harmful taxation hinders the smooth functioning of the Single
Market, as it undermines its basis of fair competition.
                                                
17 “Adjusting to Asymmetric Shocks”, Economic Affairs Series, Working Paper ECON 104
European Parliament, DGIV, September 1998.
18 Schön, W., Tax Competition in Europe – the legal perspective, EC Tax Review 2000-2,
p. 97
19 Taxation in the European Union - Report on the Development of Tax Systems, COM
(96) 546 final from 22nd of October 1996.
20 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition – An Emerging Global Issue (1998)
21 Schön, W., Tax Competition in Europe – the legal perspective, p. 96-97
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The European Union was the first governmental body to formulate measures
against harmful tax practices, as the EU released its Code of Conduct in
1997. The Code provides five broad criteria for determining a harmful tax
regime. In addition, the Member States have made a commitment not to
introduce new tax measures that are considered to be harmful and to review
and abolish existing harmful law and practices. A timetable was set to
eliminate harmful tax competition among the EU states.22 The Code of
Conduct will be discussed further on, in chapter six.
                                                
22 Katsushima, Harmful Tax Competition, Editorial, Intertax, Volume 27, issue 11, p. 396.
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4. The EEA Agreement
This chapter explains shortly the history of the EEA Agreement and the
institutions that were created in the Agreement. A discussion on methods to
solve inevitable disputes is then followed by the subject of the nature of the
Agreement and changes of the MS and how they reflect on the Agreement.
The Nature of EFTA vs. the EU is next in line. For the sake of equilibrium,
there is a short chapter on the history and institutions of the European
Union. In conclusion there is a table showing the common institutional
structure of the European Economic Area. This discussion is vital to the
subject at hand, for placing the area of taxation in it’s context.
4.1. EFTA, creation of the EEA & Institutions
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is an international
organization comprising four states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and
Switzerland.
The EFTA Treaty was originally made and signed by Austria, Denmark,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, as an
association of countries similar to the EEC. Finland and Iceland also joined
EFTA, but the founding countries except Norway and Switzerland gradually
joined the EEC.
Three of the four member states (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) have
structured their relations with the European Union (EU) in the form of the
Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA). They participate in the
Single Market through the agreement.23 The Icelandic Implementation was
through the EEA Act from 1993.24
The idea of a European Economic Area dates back to a joint EFTA-EEC
ministerial meeting in Luxembourg in 1984. Between 1984 and 1989 the
removal of obstacles to trade was undertaken on a case- by-case basis. In
1989, Jacques Delors, who was the chairman of the European Commission
at that time, launched a plan to expand the internal market to the EFTA
states, to form a European Economic Area EEA. The negotiations were
difficult as the law had to be homogenous and adapted or both the EEC and
the EFTA states without diminishing legal protection within the
Community. 25
                                                
23 http://www.efta.int
24 The EEA Act 1993 (Lög um evrópska efnahagssvæðið). For the Icelandic administration,
the adaptation of national legislation to the EU's single market legislation, accumulated
over a period of thirty years, was indeed an ambitious undertaking. Tens of thousands of
pages of legal text were identified, translated, published and implemented over a relatively
short period.
25 Van den Hurk, H., Theounissen, Al, Several institutional and fiscal aspects of the
European Economic Area, EC TAX Review, 2001 – 1, p. 26-27.
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The EEA Agreement was entered into in May 1992, for the purpose of
including the Member States of the EFTA, in the common market.26 It was
to have comprised the EC and (then) the seven EFTA States, but
Switzerland failed to ratify the EEA Agreement. Under the EEA Agreement,
which entered into force on January 1994, these States are subject to the
existing body of Community law (the acquis communitaire) relating to the
internal market and competition and all future rules in this areas. The EFTA
States are not represented in the EC institutions.27  All the annexes and acts
referred to in the EEA Agreement are integral parts of the Agreement,
which means that EC secondary legislation that is relevant for areas covered
by the EEA, is part of the Agreement.28
The ECJ denied the first chosen structure for interpretation and application
of the Treaty, in accordance with Art. 164 of the EEC Treaty, in its opinion
of 14th of December 1991.
4.1.3. Institutions & bodies29
The aim of the EEA Agreement is to guarantee the free movement of
persons, goods, services and capital and to provide equal conditions of
competition and abolish discrimination. A large part of the EEA Agreement
is identical to the relevant parts governing the fundamental freedoms as in
the Treaty of Rome of 1957.  The novel idea and an important part of the
Agreement is, that its common rules are continuously updated by new EC
legislation.
This is made functional by a EEA Joint Committee, that incorporates a
number of EEA-relevant pieces of legislation each month into the EEA
Agreement. The Joint Committee is responsible for the ongoing
management of the EEA Agreement. It provides the forum for exchange
discussions and decision-making. Decisions to incorporate Community
legislation into the EEA Agreement are taken by consensus. The Joint
Committee is made up of ambassadors of the EFTA EEA states and
representatives of the European Commission and EU member states. Five
Subcommittees assist the Joint Committee.
The EEA Council, which is composed of the foreign ministers of the EU
and EFTA & EEA countries, provides political impetus for the development
of the Agreement and guidelines for the Joint Committee. Ministers meet at
least twice a year to evaluate the functioning of the EEA Agreement and to
discuss issues of mutual interest.
                                                
26 Leegaard, T., Impact of the European Economic Area Agreement on Direct Taxation, p.
110
27 Steiner, J & Woods, L., Textbook on EC Law, P. 11
28 Leegaard, T., Impact of the European Economic Area Agreement on Direct Taxation, p.
111
29 This chapter is based on the EFTA website; http://www.efta.int
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The Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) comprises members from the
national parliaments of the EFTA & EEA states and members from the
European Parliament. The Committee contributes through dialogue and
debate to a better understanding between the Community and the EFTA
states in the fields covered by the Agreement and expresses its views in
reports and resolutions. The President of the EEA Council may appear
before the Committee in order to be heard by it. In practice, representatives
of the EEA Council, the EEA Joint Committee and the EFTA Surveillance
Authority appear regularly before the Committee for exchanges of views.
The JPC has a pure EFTA counterpart in the form of a committee of
parliamentarians from the four EFTA states.
The EEA Consultative Committee consists of an equal number of
members of the EFTA Consultative Committee and of members of the
Economic and Social Committee of the EC (representing social
partners/economic and social interest groups in the European Union). The
EEA Consultative Committee works to strengthen contacts between the
social partners on both sides and to co-operate in an organized and regular
manner to enhance awareness and provide input on the economic and social
aspects of the EEA. The EEA Consultative Committee expresses its views
in the form of reports and resolutions. The EFTA social partners also meet
in the EFTA Consultative Committee.
Of the EFTA institutions established under the EEA Agreement, the
Standing Committee of the EFTA States fulfils the role of coordinating
body in preparing for meetings of the EEA Joint Committee. It is made up
of representatives from Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein and observers
from Switzerland and the EFTA Surveillance Authority. It serves as a forum
in which the EFTA & EEA countries consult one another and arrive at a
position before meeting with the EU side in the Joint Committee. Its
structure mirrors that of the EEA Joint Committee, with five subcommittees
and a large number of working groups.
Constitutional problems that arose by allowing EU institutions to take
decisions applicable to the EFTA countries required the establishment of
two other important bodies in the EFTA pillar. A two-pillar system of
supervision of the Agreement was devised: the EU Member States are
supervised by the EC Commission and the EFTA States party to the EEA by
the EFTA Surveillance Authority.
The former is the EFTA Court, based in Luxembourg. The EFTA Court
corresponds to the Court of Justice of the European Communities in matters
relating to the EFTA EEA states. The Court deals with infringement actions
brought by the ESA. Furthermore the court hears appeals concerning
decisions taken by the ESA and gives advisory opinions to courts in the
EFTA States on the interpretation of EEA rules.
The latter is the EFTA Surveillance Authority, based in Brussels, ensures
that the EFTA & EEA states fulfill their obligations under the EEA
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Agreement. As well as general surveillance of compliance, the Surveillance
Authority has wider powers in relation to competition, State aid and public
procurement, reflecting the extended competencies of the European
Commission in these fields within the Community.
From the institutional viewpoint, the EEA is well equipped, as can be seen
above. 30 However it is relevant that the institutions within EFTA have
always been rather weak, and the application of the agreement has been
different and less forceful than enforcement of the Treaty of Rome. 31
4.2. Disputes and repercussions
The jurisdiction of the EFTA Court mainly corresponds to the jurisdiction of
the Court of Justice of the European Communities over EC States32, but the
EFTA Court has a more limited competence than the EC Court. The EFTA
Court deals with infringement actions, that are brought by the ESA33,
against an EFTA State, regarding the implementation, application or
interpretation of an EEA rule, for the settlement of disputes between two or
more EFTA States, for appeals concerning decisions taken by the EFTA
Surveillance Authority and for giving advisory opinions to courts in EFTA
States on the interpretation of EEA rules.
Furthermore, one MS may bring a case before the EFTA Court against
another MS.34
Citizens of the EFTA States and the MS themselves can bring cases against
the ESA for illegality or impropriety of its decisions, or for failure to make
obligatory decisions. There are no sanctions against MS who refuse to
comply with decisions of the EFTA Court. The EFTA Court can also give
opinions to domestic Courts, but such opinions are not binding on the
domestic courts, even if domestic Courts still rely on the opinions of the
EFTA Court in many cases.35
As the intention is to maintain a homogenous interpretation of Community
law and that part of EEA law which is identical to it, the Joint Committee is
charged with keeping the development of the case-law of the Court of
Justice and the EFTA Court under constant review, to preserve the
homogenous interpretation of the Agreement.36 If a difference in case law of
                                                
30 Kaptayn P.J.G., & VerLoren van Themaat, P., Introduction to the Law of the European
Communities, p. 1333
31 Björn Friðfinnsson, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical
Affairs, http://www.ees.is
32 The EFTA website; http://efta.int
33 Art. 31 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a surveillance
authority and a Court of Justice, signed in Oporto 2 May 1992.
34 Art. 32 of the Agreement – see footnote 34.
35 Leegard, T., Impact of the European Economic Area Agreement on Direct Taxation: A
Norwegian Perspective, p 111.
36 Art. 105(2) EEA.
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the two courts arises, the Joint Committee, in order preserve homogenous
interpretation is to act according to a special procedure. If the Joint
Committee has not resolved the dispute within two months, the parties may
place the matter before the Court of Justice for a ruling on the interpretation
of the relevant rules. This applies however only if the dispute concerns
provisions of the EEA Agreement which are identical in substance to those
of the EC or ECSC Treaties and legislation adopted hereunder. If the Joint
Committee has not resolved the dispute within six months or if the
Contracting Parties have not referred the matter to the Court of Justice,
safeguard measures may be taken or provisional suspension of the disputed
provision may follow. 37
It should also be mentioned, that there have been changes in Icelandic Tax
Law, due to the actions of the EFTA Surveillance Authority, without
involvement of the Court.1 One amendment worth mentioning is a
stipulation in the Icelandic tax law that enabled private persons to deduct a
certain amount of Icelandic kronas from their taxable income, if they had
bought shares in Icelandic companies with certain conditions. These
provisions were changed to include purchase of shares in companies in the
European Economic Area, as changed with Law nr. 86/2000, amending Act
75/1981, on income- and property tax.
4.3. The nature of the EEA Agreement
The EEA Agreement has in many ways a special character for a
multinational treaty. For example, the institutional structure is advanced, but
the quality of a dynamic agreement is somewhat unusual, because there are
no legislative powers conferred on the EEA institutions. Supremacy of EEA
law is another quality, the instruments of implementation consistent with EC
law.  The Principle of uniformity is yet another element, imposing a duty of
a uniform interpretation in future case-law development in areas that are
corresponding to the EC treaties.
4.3.1.  Dynamic
A very important objective of the EEA Agreement is the objective of
establishing a dynamic and homogeneous European Economic Area, as
stated in the preamble of the Agreement. As explained before, EC secondary
legislation that has been recognized as relevant for the areas that are covered
by the EEA is part of the agreement itself. In principle, the EEA Agreement
is a traditional multinational treaty.
                                                
37 Kaptayn P.J.G., & VerLoren van Themaat, P., Introduction to the Law of the European
Communities, p. 1333
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4.3.2 Uniform
Article 6 of the EEA Agreement imposes the duty of a uniform
interpretation in future case-law development in areas that are
corresponding to the EC treaties38. Art. 6 is the following:
Without prejudice to future developments of case-law, the
provisions of this Agreement, in so far as they are identical in
substance to corresponding rules of the Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community and the Treaty establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community and to acts adopted in
application of these two Treaties, shall, in their implementation
and application, be interpreted in conformity with the relevant
rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Communities
given prior to the date of signature in this Agreement.
This provision makes the relevant jurisprudence of the ECJ up to the date of
signing, binding on the interpretation and application of the EEA agreement
by the ECJ, the EFTA Court and domestic courts in EEA MS.39 There has
been a debate whether the jurisprudence since the date of signing is binding
as well and in practice. Furthermore, Art. 3 of the ESA/EFTA Court Treaty,
adds that the jurisprudence of the ECJ has to be taken into account when it
concerns provisions that are essentially equal to those of the EC Treaty,
after the signature of the Treaty. 40
The EFTA Court has treated jurisprudence of the ECJ as relevant in its
judgments despite a later date than is specificly mentioned in Art. 6., as can
be seen in the case of Islandsbanki41,42 where a judgment of the ECJ from
1995 was quoted.43
Furthermore, in the case Erla María Sveinbjörnsdóttir44, the EFTA Court
held that the nature of the EEA Agreement was an international treaty sui
                                                
38 Björgvinsson, D.Þ., Afmælisrit Gauks Jörundssonar, p. 187-188
39 Leegaard, Thor, Impact of the European Economic Area Agreement on Direct Taxation:
A Norwegian Perspective, p. 112
40 Van den Hurk, H., Theounissen, Al, Several institutional and fiscal aspects of the
European Economic Area,  p. 32-33
41 EFTA Court of Justice, Case E-1/00, State Debt Management Agency v. Islandsbanki
FBA hf.
42 Leegaard, Thor, Impact of the European Economic Area Agreement on Direct Taxation:
A Norwegian Perspective, p. 112
43 ”In addition, as the Court of Justice of the European Communities has previously held,
the borrowing of money from a bank in another Contracting Party falls within the scope of
capital movement within the meaning of the Directive (see insofar Case C-484/93 Svensson
and Gustavsson [1995] ECR I-3955).”
44 EFTA Court of Justice, Case E 9/97, Erla María Sveinbjörnsdóttir v. Government of
Iceland, 10 December 1998. It was established in the judgment that it was a principle of the
EEA Agreement that an EFTA State was obliged to provide for compensation for loss and
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generic, containing a distinct legal order of its own. The conclusion of the
Court was that the agreement went further than normal international treaties,
but had less profound effects than EC law. 45
 In a new judgment from the EFTA Court46 the Karlsson case, the Court
says among other that it follows from Art. 7 EEA47 and Protocol 35 to the
EEA Agreement that EEA law does not entail a transfer of legislative
powers. Furthermore the Court says:
 At the same time it is inherent in the general objective of the
EEA Agreement of establishing a dynamic and homogenous
market, in the ensuing emphasis on the judicial defense and
enforcement of rights of individuals, as well as in the public
international law principle of effectiveness, that national courts
will consider any relevant element of EEA law, whether
implemented or not, when interpreting national law. .. ” The
Court goes on in another quotation: “The absence of recognition
of direct effect for EEA rules does not preclude the existence of
an obligation on the State to provide for compensation for loss
and damage caused to individuals and economic operators as a
result of breaches of obligations under the EEA Agreement for
which that State can be held responsible.
The Court acknowledged state liability, despite its words that there was not
direct effect for EEA rules.
4.3.3. Supremacy
Art. 7 of the EEA Agreement requires that the EFTA Member States
implement the Agreement and subsidiary legislation in domestic law, in a
way that is consistent with equivalent instruments in EC Law, even if the
form and method of implementation is in discretion of the MS. When
parliament decides in subsequent legislation to override the EEA
Agreement, the national courts must follow that decisions rather than the
Agreement. Special provisions in the relevant acts implementing the
Agreement, in Iceland, secure the EEA Act from 1993 the supremacy of
EEA law.48
                                                                                                                           
damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of the obligations under the EEA
Agreement, for which the State could be held responsible.
45 Leegaard, T., Impact of the European Economic Area Agreement on Direct Taxation: A
Norwegian Perspective, p. 111
46 The Karlsson case from May 30th 2002, Case E-4/01.
47 Art. 7 of the EEA Agreement requires that the EFTA MS implement the Agreement and
subsidiary legislation in domestic law in a way that is consistent with equivalent
instruments of EC law.
48 Leegaard, T., Impact of the European Economic Area Agreement on Direct Taxation: A
Norwegian Perspective, p. 113
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4.4. Changes of the agreement? Diminishing
importance?
The changes that have been made on the European Union since 1991, when
the EEA Agreement was made, have without doubt diminished the
importance of the EEA Agreement. Among the changes is diminished
influence of the EFTA states on the legal development, partly with increased
power of the European Parliament. With enlargement to the east, it is likely
that the possibilities for the EFTA states to influence the direction and the
work of the European Union will diminish even further, simply because
there will be more Member States.
On the other hand, the enlargement of the European Union also means
enlargement of the EEA Area, which can bring about more business
opportunities for the EFTA countries, but also new problems.
The issue of enlargement of the European Union has many implications. An
enlarged EU also means an enlarged Internal Market benefit that will affect
all members of the EEA, comprising close to half a billion people with the
world’s largest Internal Market. Article 128 of the EEA Agreement
stipulates that a State becoming a member of the EU shall become a
member of the EEA.49
Even if the practical importance of the EEA Agreement has undoubtedly
diminished as a result of the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to
the European Union, the EEA phase facilitated the accession negotiations.
4.5. The nature of the EFTA vs. the EU
What is the difference between EEA and EU membership? There are four
main criteria that describe the difference:
1. the EEA Agreement does not extend to all sectors (agriculture and
fisheries being major areas not fully covered by the Agreement).
2. the EEA is not a customs union and has no common external tariff,
although it provides for fundamentally improved free trade. Border
controls amongst the EFTA EEA and EU states are greatly
facilitated.
3. the EEA Agreement does not include a common commercial policy,
but the EFTA states have in many cases concluded trade agreements
parallel to those of the EU with third countries.
                                                
49 Björn Friðfinnsson, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical
Affairs, lectures on the web-site http://www.ees.is
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4. The EEA entails no transfer of legislative power from the
parliaments of contracting parties to the EEA institutions, which
necessitates for decisions adopted by the EEA Joint Committee to be
transposed into national legislation.
A membership in EFTA is thus much more limited than a membership in
the European Union.  It is important that with the exception of the actions
related to economic and taxation policies, all relevant Community
legislation in the field of the Internal Market has been integrated into the
Agreement.50,51
4.6. Introduction of the European Union
For the sake of coherence, there will be a short introduction of the European
Union, its’ history and institutions. Furthermore, the introduction is intended
to give a fuller picture of the structure of the European Economic Area.
4.6.1. A brief history of the development of the
European Union
In 1956, an intergovernmental conference was held in Venice, participating
were the ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg, Germany (Western-Germany), France and Italy. On the
conference, the basis for further negotiations was set, resulting in the Treaty
on the European Community of Coal and Steel from 1958, the Treaty on the
Nuclear Energy from 1952 and the Treaty on the European Economic
Community from 1958.
The political-economic objective of the preamble of the EEC Treaty of
1957, has since then been consolidated by a number of amendments. The
Single European Act in 1986 gave the Internal Market a decisive impetus.
The Maastricht Treaty from 1992 enabled a new state where the MS
resolved to achieve the strengthening and convergence of their economies
and to establish an economic and monetary union. 52
The former Article N(2) in the Treaty of the European Union, provided that
an intergovernmental conference should be held in 1996, resulting in the
Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed on October 2nd 1997 and entered
into force on May 1999.53
                                                
50 The chapter is based on lectures on the web-site http://www.ees.is , by Björn
Friðfinnsson, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs
51 It can be mentioned, that a new Agreement between EFTA and Switzerland entered into
force very recently. The Agreement establishes the same economic connection as
Switzerland’s connection with the European Union.
52 Schön, W, Tax Competition in Europe – the legal perspective, p. 90.
53 Steiner, J., & Woods, L., Textbook on EC LAW, p. 7
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4.6.2. Institutions of the EU54
It is unavoidable to outline the principal institutions of the European Union,
to maintain the right context with regards to the institutional structure of the
EEA Agreement.
The basis structure of the European union is commonly characterized as a
three-pillar co-operation, comprising three different areas. In pillar number
one are significant supranational elements and several federal features. The
first pillar comprises the treaties mentioned above; the ECSC-, the Euratom
and the EC-Treaty. The second pillar comprises common security and
foreign policy and the third pillar comprises co-operation on home and
justice affairs.55
Figure 256
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                                                        EC-Treaty                    EC
          II. Common security and foreign
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Supranational     Interstate
Representatives of MS, democratically elected, compose the European
Parliament. The Parliament has played an increasingly important role in the
legislative process and has decisive power over the budget. Furthermore the
European Parliament has direct political control over the Commission.
The Council of the European Union consists of one representative of each
MS, at a ministerial level. The Council is to ensure that the objectives of the
Treaty are attained and has the final power of decision on most secondary
legislation.
                                                
54 A very descriptive image of the interconnection between  the EU & the EEA institutions
can be found on the EFTA website; http://www.efta.int/structure/SURV/efta-srv.asp
55 Ohlin, H., A Comparative Analysis of Two “Federal” Tax Systems, Final paper, Faculty
of Law, University of Lund, 1999.
56 Shaw, J., European Community Law, p. 3-8
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The Commission has been described as “the guardian of the Treaties”,
consisting of 20 members57 chosen on the grounds of their competence. The
Commissioners are to be independent in their duties. The Commission has
the power of initiative and acts as the Community watchdog, seeking out
infringements of EC law. The Commission also has the task of enforcing the
EC competition policy.
The Court of Justice consists of 15 judges, one from each MS, assisted by
8 advocates-general. The role of the ECJ is to ensure that the law is
observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaty.
The Court of First Instance was established in 1986, consisting of 15
judges, with jurisdiction for staff cases and applications for judicial review
and damages by natural and legal persons, according to Articles 230 and
232 of the EC Treaty.
It does not serve the purpose of this paper to discuss other institutions, such
as the Court of Auditors or the Economic and Social Committee.
4.7. The common institutional structure of the
European Economic Area.
In the chapters above, the institutions of the European Economic Area  have
been introduced shortly. The following table clarifies the institutional
framework of the EEA Agreement 58:
Table 1
European Communities European Free Trade
Association
European Economic Area
European Parliament Committee of Members of
Parliament of the EFTA
States
EEA Joint Parliamentary
Committee
EU Council EFTA Standing Committee EEA Council
EU Commission EFTA Surveillance
Authority
EEA Joint Committee
EU Court of Justice EFTA Court
Economic and Social
Committee
EFTA Consultative
Committee
EEA Consultative
Committee
                                                
57 Changes have been made with the Nice Treaty, to meet the proposed enlargement of the
EU.
58 Van den Hurk, H., Theounissen, Al, Several institutional and fiscal aspects of the
European Economic Area, EC TAX Review, 2001 – 1, p. 29
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5. Taxation
As has been established here above, the EEA Agreement integrates parts of
acquis communis into the aquis of the Member States of the Agreement,
including Iceland. It is therefore important to establish the main rules and
judgments that taxation in the European Union rests on, especially in the
light of Art. 6 of the EEA Agreement that has been mentioned before and
the fact that the EFTA Court seems in practice to adhere to the
jurisprudence of the ECJ in terms of judgments that are delivered after the
signature of the Agreement.
5.1. Taxation in the European Union
In the EEC Treaty of 1957 and the Amsterdam Treaty, there are specific tax
provisions providing basis for Community authorities insofar as they affect
the free movement of goods, as can be seen in Art. 293, addressing double
taxation. This is the only Article addressing direct taxation in the EC Treaty.
Despite this fact, the area of taxes has been harmonized in accordance with
the treaties through the stipulations of the fundamental freedoms and State
Aid.
5.1.1. Sovereignty of the MS
A state’s power to tax is part of its power to the purse. This taxation power
comprises legislative power, administrative power and entitlement to the tax
revenue and judicial authority. The power of taxation ensures the
sovereignty of the state, providing the necessary public funds for the state to
function. The question therefore arises: How is the national power of
taxation limited by the fundamental freedoms and non-discrimination
clauses of the EC Treaty? The fundamental freedoms are considered; the
free movement of workers, (Art. 39ff), freedom of establishment (Art. 43),
free movement of services (Art. 49) and free movement of capital (Art.
56).59
5.1.2. Fundamental freedoms
The fundamental freedoms are built upon the principles of a prohibition of
discrimination on grounds of nationality and the right to cross the borders of
the Member States without disproportionate restrictions.60
Under EC law, restrictions on intra-Community trade and investment are
prohibited. The principle that MS may not restrict the freedoms that are
                                                
59 Lehner, M., Limitation of the National Power of Taxation,  p. 6-7.
60 Bergström, S., Bruzelius, A, Home-State Restrictions on the Freedom of Establishment in
a Swedish Income Tax Law Perspective, p. 234.
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guaranteed by the treaties is based on Art. 10 of the EC Treaty. This
provision is to be applied only in the absence of a specific rule of EC law.
The
The fundamental freedom provisions in the EC Treaty are directly
applicable legal rules and constitute primary Community law. Thus, they do
not require further specification through legal acts that are adopted by the
Community organs or by national legislators.61 The ECJ has confirmed in its
rulings that the fundamental freedom provisions in the EC Treaty are
directly applicable. This has the effect, that if a national tax rule is
inconsistent with the fundamental freedom provisions, EC law will override
these rules.62
The concept of the fundamental freedoms can be conceived as an umbrella
concept, put in concrete terms by the non-discrimination clauses and the
prohibition of restrictions in Art. 39, 45, 49, and 56, as maintained by
Kingreen, Scweitzer and Hummer.63
5.1.3. Legal framework
The competence of the area of direct taxes does not fall under the
jurisdiction of the European Union, even if the indirect taxes, such as VAT
(Value Added Tax) and excise taxes are within the power sphere of the
European Union according to Article 93 EC (former Art. 99 EC). However,
in Art. 56 EC, it is stipulated that the EU should abolish any obstacles that
hinder free flow of capital between MS. In order to meet these objectives,
there have been adopted directives by the Council.64
Since the end of the 1960s, there has been a substantial harmonization of
Community legislation in the area of indirect taxation through directives, for
example the Parent-Subsidiarity Directive65 and the merger directive66, but
this legislation can be deemed rather restrained, as the result of this limited
legal basis and the effect of the principle of subsidiarity. The EC Directives
on taxes are not included in the EEA Treaty, but a possible effect of the
Parent-Subsidiarity Directive is discussed in chapter 8.
Furthermore there have been amendments made in the domestic law in MS.
For example, rules on tax-free distributions, where foreign companies
belonging to a state within the European Economic Area, in a group of
companies, should not affect the possibility of group contributions between
two Swedish companies. Also the rules are applicable if the recipient of
group contributions is a Swedish company with residence in an EEA state,
                                                
61 Schuch, J., EC law requires multilateral tax treaty, p. 36
62 Schuch, J., EC law requires multilateral tax treaty, p. 31
63 Lehner, M., Limitation of the National Power of Taxation, p. 7
64 Ohlin, H., A comparative analysis of two “federal” tax systems, p. 14.
65 Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23rd of July 1990. Other directive is for example:
Directive 77/799/EEG, Mutual Assistance.
66 Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23rd of July 1990.
27
as the result of the application of provisions in a tax treaty on the conditions
that it carries out activities in Sweden through a permanent establishment 67.
5.1.4. Judgments
The European Court of Justice has had great influence on the development
of community law in the area of direct taxation. It is necessary to introduce
briefly some of the judgments, where there the COJ has interpreted the
internal legislation of the MS.68
The fact that there is not competence for the European Union in the area of
direct taxation does not necessarily mean that there is no development of
community law within that area. The European Court of Justice comes into
the picture and the ECJ has determined in a number of cases whether
national direct taxes are in harmony with the Community laws or not.69
The prohibition of discrimination is in Art. 12 of the EC Treaty. The non-
discrimination clauses, as interpreted and administered by the European
Court of Justice, have been called either “hidden harmonization” or
“negative harmonization”70. This is by no means harmonization, but rather
ECJ´s adjudication on fundamental freedoms and non-discrimination that
concern provisions of the EC Treaty which can be directly invoked by
citizens of the European Union. The ECJ may not declare domestic
regulations void, but it may determine a conflict with Community law. 71
The ECJ sets out in its judgments, to ascertain whether a national rule is
consistent with the non-discrimination principles, which are incorporated
into the EC Treaty. The Court, having affirmed that the provisions of the
fundamental freedoms are directly applicable, examines whether two
situations are comparable, by comparing taxpayers who are subject to
specific rules, to other taxpayers in similar situation where the rule in
question is not applied or another rule is applicable.72 Discrimination arises
when different rules are applied to comparable situations or when the same
rule is applied to different situation. Discrimination only arises when two
comparable situations are regulated by the same sovereign power and
therefore a treatment granted to a taxpayer in one state cannot be compared
to the treatment of other taxpayers in another state. 73
                                                
67 Bergström, S., Bruzelius, A, Home-State Restrictions on the Freedom of Establishment in
a Swedish Income Tax Law Perspective, p. 233.
68 It has been discussed in this connection, whether the COJ has in fact exceeded its´
jurisdiction in matters of taxation. This will however not be a topic here and the point of
departure is thus that the COJ is performing its duties according to the treaties.
69 Ohlin, H., A comparative analysis of two “federal”  tax systems
70 Weatherhill and Beaumont, EC Law (2nd edition) , p. 254.
71 Lehner, M., Limitation of the National Power of Taxation, p. 7.
72 See the Wielockx judgment in chapter 4.2.
73Schuch, J., EC law requires multilateral tax treaty, p. 31-36
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In this chapter, 8 judgments will therefore be mentioned shortly as they are
all of great importance in this context, as explained here above.
1. In the case of Avoir fiscal74, (which was the first case concerning
income taxation), a tax credit (avoir fiscal) was available to French
companies, but not to foreign companies. The ECJ found that this
was a discrimination against the foreign companies according to Art.
52 (now Art. 43) of the EC Treaty. This judgment clarified, that the
principle of non-discrimination was MS´s internal income tax
regulations, despite the fact that they did not fall within the scope the
competence of the Union. 75
2. In the case of Bachmann, 76 the conclusion of the European Court of
Justice was, that covert discrimination, where a national tax rule was
working to the particular detriment of a non-resident, in taxation
matters can be justified by the public interest in fiscal coherence.
The COJ held, that the Belgian rules which discriminated indirectly
against foreign workers, by refusing tax deduction of life insurance
premiums and pensions contributions, when paid to insurers who
were not established in Belgium, were justified on public interest
grounds because of the need to preserve the cohesion of the MS´s
tax system. Therefore tax deduction of premiums was justified only
if the MS in question could be sure to collect the tax on the
subsequent insurance benefits.
3. In the case of Futura,77 - there was a dual approach, based on
discrimination in relation to tax burden and a restriction-based
analysis. A restriction-based analysis stands for a term, that has been
increasingly used by the COJ on the four-freedom Articles, that a
non-discriminatory rule, that restricts one of the freedoms, may be
caught by the Treaty, unless it is justified grounds related to the
public interest such as fiscal supervision, or public health or
environmental protection. 78
4. In the case of Schumacker,79 a Belgian national who was a resident
in Belgium but employed in Germany, he was taxed without without
taking account of his personal situation. Mr. Schumacker then
applied to German tax authorities for a taxation under a different
category, where his family situation would be taken into account, but
was denied. The appeal went to the Bundesfinanzhof, where the COJ
was asked for opinion. The COJ maintained that Art. 48 prevented
Germany from different taxation due to nationality. The Article did
                                                
74 Avoir fiscal, ECJ 28 Janurary 1986, case C-270/83
75 Ohlin, H., A comparative analysis of two “federal” tax systems, p. 18-19
76 Bachmann v. Belgian State, C-204/90 [1992] ECR I-249
77 Futura Participations and Singer v. Administration des Contributions, C-250/95
78 Farmer, P., EC law and national rules on direct taxation: a phoney war?, EC Tax review,
1998-1, P. 13-xx
79 Schumacker  Case C-279/93 [1995] ECR I-225.
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not in principle prevent a MS from taxing the income of a non-
resident more heavily than that of a resident, but in a situation where
the non-resident received no significant income in the resident state,
thereby precluding the resident state from taking account of the
taxpayers personal circumstances, constituted discrimination. The
discrimination was due to the fact that neither state could take his
personal that the right of persons exercising their Community
freedoms to national treatment does not necessarily place them in the
same position as and family circumstances into account. This ruling
acknowledges national taxpayers. There is an obvious distinction
between personal relief, which is the responsibility of the resident
state, and source-related employment and business relief, which
must be granted on the same terms to residents and non-residents
under the non-discrimination rule. This brings us to the Wielockx
case.
5. In the case of Wielockx, 80 where a Belgian national, resident in
Belgium, wanted to appropriate a part of his business profit to a
pension reserve, as allowed by the Netherlands rules of taxation for
self-employed persons. Mr. Wielockx was a partner in a
physiotherapy practice in the Netherlands, who was not permitted to
set up a pension reserve, as a non-resident taxpayer. He argued that
this was against Art. 52 of the Treaty. The COJ followed the same
line of reasoning as in Schumacker, rejected the arguments of the
Netherlands Government based on the Bachmann judgment. The
Netherlands Government argued that if a non-resident could set up a
pension reserve in the Netherlands, the pension would not be taxed
there, since such income should be taxed in the state of residence
according the a double-taxation Convention between the countries.
The COJ did not accept this argument based on the principle of
fiscal coherence, and referred to the OECD Convention where fiscal
cohesion was secured by a bilateral convention.
6. In the case of Commission v. France,81 the French legislation
restricted shareholders´ tax credits on dividends from French
companies to persons with residence or registered office in France.
The Commission contended that France had infringed Art. 52 of the
Treaty, by not granting the credits to French branches or agencies of
insurance companies of other MS, on the same terms as to the
French companies. The French government argued among other that
there would be a distortion as foreign companies might place their
French shares in the hands of a permanent establishment rather than
in subsidiaries, as neither French domestic law nor double tax
agreements granted tax credits to foreign companies with major
holdings in French companies. The COJ replied that the absence of
harmonization did not preclude the application of Art. 52 and said
that the risk of tax avoidance was not of importance in this context,
                                                
80 Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen, C-80/94 [1995] ECR I-2493
81 Commission v. France, 270/83 [1986] ECR 273.
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as Art. 52 of the EEC Treaty did not permit derogation from the
fundamental principle of freedom of establishment.
7. In the case of Asscher,82 a stipulation in the Netherlands provided
that taxpayers who were non-resident and obtained less than 90% of
their worldwide income in the Netherlands, should pay tax at a
higher rate on part of their income. Mr. Asscher, who was a
Netherlands national, was a director of his own a private limited
company in the Netherlands and also a manager of a Belgian
company and carried his work out in Belgium. In 1986, Mr. Asscher
moved to Belgium, without changing his activities and was only
taxable on his Netherlands income in the Netherlands, but the rest of
his income was taxable in Belgium, where, under the double taxation
Convention between the two countries, Belgium could take the
Netherlands income into account for progressive taxation. Mr.
Asscher maintained that this constituted indirect discrimination on
grounds of nationality contrary to Arts. 7 and 48 of the EC Treaty.
The ECJ found that there was a difference in treatment between
residents and non-residents as Mr. Asscher did in fact get
progressive taxation under the double taxation Convention and was
in fact discriminated. The Court considered whether this could be
justified. The Netherlands Government the argument that the
different treatment was necessary to ensure the cohesion of the tax
system under the principle laid down in Bachmann.. The COJ
replied, that a higher tax rate did not prove any social security
protection, referring to Council Regulation 1408/71.  The arguments
were thus rejected.83
8. In the case of Safir,84 the case was about assurances taken in
companies, that were situated in other countries. The Swedish rules
treated assurances in Swedish companies differently than those
signed in foreign companies. The ECJ held, that this was a
restriction and a violation of Art. 59 (now Art. 49) EC, as the rules
impaired frr movement of services. The Court further stated, that
even if direct taxes did not at the moment fall under the competence
of the Community, the MS still had an obligation to respect EC law
when designing their national tax systems.85
The legislative sovereignty in taxation, between the Community and the MS
is by far the largest issue dominating taxation policy in the European Union.
As has been discussed above, the fundamental freedoms set limits to MS
action and thus restrict the tax competition between the players on the
Internal Market. The European Court of Justice has been the dominating
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instrument of the institutions of the European Union to establish the
limitations of the MS, as it has the obligation to ensure the Community’s
principles are upheld. Taxation should not and is not sheltered from this
fundamental consideration, as can be seen by the judgments above.
5.1.5. The EU and State aid
A sharp and important weapon against distortion of competition is to be
found in former Articles 92-94, now Articles 87-89 EC on State aids. These
Articles form a special set of rules for aids granted by MS or paid in any
way by means of state resources, which distort or threaten to distort
competition, by favoring certain undertakings or production of certain
goods. State aids are declared to be incompatible in principle with the
common market to the extent to which they affect trade between MS – they
form an essential complement of the free movement provisions. 86
The Commission published, in November 1998, a notice on the application
of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation87. This
notice has the aim to link the provisions of the Treaty and related rules on
State aid to fight against harmful tax competition and it also has the wider
objective of clarifying and reinforcing the application of State aid rules to
reduce distortions of competition in the Single Market.
In Article 87(1) the basic test for State aids is laid down. It covers aid given
to public undertakings that come within Article 86, as well as to private
companies. In paragraph 1, the general principle is established, that State aid
is incompatible with the common market. The reasons for State aid is not
relevant nor the form, in the view of the ECJ and the Commission. 88 In Art.
87(2), certain exceptions are provided, where aid will be deemed to be
compatible with the common market. In Art. 87(3), there are discretionary
exceptions, developed by the Commission but subject to judicial review.
Aid can thus be designed to restructure an undertaking, to rescue an
undertaking or to help with operating costs. The Community Guidelines on
State aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty89 are aimed at
those.
The Commission makes the assessment that fiscal aid is considered to be
State aid, with the cumulative meeting of four criteria:
1. “The measure must confer an advantage of recipients,
relieving them of charges that they would normally have to
bear by their budgets.
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2. The advantage must be granted by the state or through state
resources
3. the measure must affect competition and trade between
Member States.
4. the measure must be specific or selective, favoring “certain
undertakings or the production of certain goods”. 90
The various prohibitions of discrimination of the Treaty which aim to ensure
equal competitive conditions, such as the declaration of incompatibility of
State aids with the common market correspond to the principle of equity. 91
The State aid rules limit the autonomy of the MS & EEA States, as provided
for by Art. 87 et seq. of the EC Treaty and Articles 61-64 in the EEA, in
order to ensure the same rules for actors on the internal market.
5.2. The Code of Conduct
It is impossible to discuss taxation in the European Union, without touching
up on the issue of the EU Code of Conduct. The Code was designed to
counter harmful tax competition, in the form of a political commitment of
the MS of the European Union The Code of Conduct in relation to harmful
taxation from an Icelandic perspective will be discussed in the final chapter.
5.2.1. Introduction
The European Commission prepared a white paper on “Taxation in the
European Union92, which was discussed in on an informal ECOFIN Council
meeting Verona in 1996. The discussions were maintained, leading to an
unanimous adoption of a Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, by the
ECOFIN Council93. In the preamble, it is stated that the Code is to concern
tax measures that affect, or may affect, in a significant way, the location of
business activity in the Community.94
The Code of Conduct represented a new strategy in the field of corporate
taxation, after many reports95 and several attempts by the Commission to
introduce legislation that had all failed. The Code took the form of a
political agreement under which MS undertook to end tax practices that
might damage fair competition within the Single Market.  Application of the
                                                
90 Editorial – How State aid affects tax competition, EC Tax Review 1999/4 p. 209-210,
91 Kapteyn P.J.G., & VerLoren van Themaat, P., Introduction to the Law of the European
Communities, p. 132.
92 Taxation in the European Union, European Commission, March 20th 1996, s. (96) 487
final,
93 Conclusions of the ECOFIN-Council meeting on 1 December 1997 concerning tax
policy, OJ, C 2/1 1998.
94 Landmark agreement ….
95 most recently the Ruding Report, from 1992
33
Code led to the creation of the Primarolo Group, which reported at the end
of 1999, having examined 271 tax measures, notified those under the terms
of the Code, and identified 66 that affected “in significant way the location
of business activity in the Community”. The Group’s mandate has now been
extended to monitor the “roll-back”96 of these measures, and to ensure that a
”standstill” on new measures is maintained.97
However, in the opinion of Prof. Maarten J. Ellis, the tax systems of Europe
have not converged, but grown further apart since the birth of the Code of
Conduct. Furthermore the use of tax measures to attract business and
investment has increased, simultaneously as the uncertainty about the
outcome of the discussion on the Code of Conduct has had negative effect
of new investment decisions. Prof. Ellis believes that a new Commissioner
has brought a change of direction towards removing impediments instead of
removing harmful competition. 98
5.2.2 Political commitment - scope
The Code of Conduct was adopted by the Council as a resolution, not as a
legally binding instrument. Therefore, the Code is merely a political
commitment of the MS to comply with their agreement and its provisions
may not be enforced through legal remedies by the EU institutions or the
MS.99
This means that observance cannot be assured through local court or the
European Court of Justice. Observance relies foremost on peer pressure. The
Commission may however hold a powerful instrument as it has the
exclusive power to, with the State aid provisions of the EC Treaty. 100 There
is some overlapping in the scope of the Code of Conduct vs. State aid rules,
although it is clear, that the Code has much wider scope, as all tax measures
that are covered by the State aid rules are covered by the Code of Conduct
as well.101
The scope of the Code of Conduct is wider than that of the OECD Report,102
because it covers business taxation as a whole and not merely taxation on
income from mobile activities, although the OECD Report is geographically
more extended. Indirect taxation and direct taxation on individuals are
excluded from both documents. The Code of Conduct points out that
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measures that are potentially harmful are those providing for an effective tax
burden, which is significantly lower than what is applicable under the
standard system of a certain country, including zero taxation. 103
The following table shows the major criteria for identifying harmful tax
practices, as compared by the EU Code of Conduct and the OECD Report.
Table 2.104
Criterion to identify harmful tax practices
EU
Code of
Conduct
OECD
Report
i) No or only nominal taxes O X
ii) Deviation of a tax measure from the “benchmark”
tax system
X X
iii) Ring-fencing from the domestic economy X X
iv) No substantial economic presence X X
v) Computation of taxable income according to
principles other than internationally accepted ones
X X
vi) Lack of transparency (administrative practices) X X
vii) Lack of effective change of information (banking
secrecy legislation)
- X
viii) Other economic indicators O X
X = explicitly indicated O = Implied  -= Not
indicated
The criteria of the Code of Conduct are designed to single out the most
damaging mechanisms; the working method is based on transparency,
openness, dialogue and critical analysis. No new preferential or harmful tax
regimes have been crated since the work on the Code of Conduct began. 105
5.3. The EEA Agreement and taxes
The EEA Agreement was not meant to include any cooperation in the field
of taxation and in Norway the position has been that the agreement does not
apply to direct tax measures.106 The same can be said about the position in
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Iceland. Is it really so, that Iceland is completely free to create its own
taxation policy and rules?
As a starting point it must be mentioned that certain secondary legislation
containing tax provisions was included in the EEA Agreement from the
beginning, such as Council Regulation 1612/68, on the free movement of
workers107, which contains a provision in Art. 7 stating that foreign workers
shall be granted same tax treatment as resident workers. The 1990 tax
directives on Merger and the Parent-Subsidiary Directive are not a part of
the EEA agreements.108
5.3.1. The Fundamental freedoms - EEA
The fundamental freedoms can have consequences for the tax law of the
partners of the EEA Agreement. The Articles covering the fundamental
freedoms and the State aid rules are mostly identical to the corresponding
Articles of the EC Treaty, except for certain differences in the rules
applying to the free movement of goods and capital.109 The principle of
conformity in Art. 6 of the EEA Agreement also suggest that the
jurisprudence of the ECJ concerning direct taxation should apply under the
Agreement.
The EEA countries are however not totally without resources as the
principles apply also in regard to taxes. In this respect any kind of
discrimination on grounds of nationality is forbidden (Art. 4). The same
goes for freedom of establishment (Art. 31.) and the free movement of
workers (Art. 28.). Furthermore freedom to provide services (Art. 36) and
free movement of capital (Art. 40) are to be found in the EEA agreement.
Articles 10 and 11 of the EEA Agreement also prohibit customs and the
quantitative restrictions on imports having equivalent effect.  Finally, Art.
14 of the EEA Agreement states that no Contracting Party shall impose,
directly or indirectly, on the products of other Contracting Parties, any
internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly
on similar domestic products.
It is obvious that different rules of taxation between the EU and the EFTA
states, caused by further harmonization can impede the flow of goods within
the European Economic Area.110
Art. 31 of the EEA Treaty corresponds with Art. 43 of the EC Treaty, that
has direct effect since the transitional period has passed.111 Freedom of
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Establishment within the EEA concerns persons with an EU or EFTA state
nationality and companies established in accordance with the law of such a
state. The freedom of establishment is similar with the free movement of
workers and self-employed persons and the freedom to provide services,
giving residents of an EU/EFTA state right of establishment without
restrictions due to the difference in treatment on basis of nationality, place
of establishment, laws on the basis of which a companies has been
established or similar criterions.112
An important case is derived from the EFTA Court from December 10th
1998 in the Herbert Rainford-Towning case113. In this case a national
provision was at issue that demanded that the director of a legal person
should reside in Liechtenstein, as well as the legal person, and the
application of a certain facility depended on this action. This provision was
found to be against Art. 31. of the EEA Treaty because of indirect
discrimination. The possible justification of unequal treatment with an
appeal to government policy as mentioned in Art. 33 of the EEA Treaty was
not accepted.
5.3.2 Direct effect?
The prohibition of Art. 56 of the EC Treaty has direct effect. It is not clear
as of now, to what extent the EEA provisions have and equal effect
compared to the EC provisions. Art. 40 of the EEA Treaty corresponds to
the old Art. 67 of the EEC Treaty, stating that within the framework of the
EEA Treaty, there are no restrictions on the free movement of capital
belonging to persons residing or established in the EEA states. 114
It seems clear that Art. 31 has direct effect and the same scope as Art. 43 of
the EC Treaty, stating that restrictions on the freedom of establishment of
nationals of an EEA state on the territory of another EEA state are
prohibited.  The freedom of establishment also entails the freedom to choose
a place of establishment, as stated in the case of Daily Mail115 that the
freedom of establishment also included the freedom of departure.
Furthermore, the freedom of establishment entails the freedom to choose
between the use of a permanent establishment and a subsidiary in a MS, as
maintained in ECJ´s judgments Avoir fiscal116 and Commerzbank 117, where
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it was established that Art. 52 also included the freedom to choose the best
applicable legal form. 118
The provisions on equal treatment thus prohibit discrimination on the basis
of nationality, giving corporations the right to perform their activities in
another EEA state by means of an agency, branch or a subsidiary on the
same conditions as the nationals in that state.
A Treaty provision has direct effect when three conditions are fulfilled; The
provision must be clear, unconditional and there must be no discretionary
freedom left to the judge. In the case Van Gend & Loos119, the ECJ stated
that the Community constituted a separate legal order, including direct
effect of the EEC Treaty provisions, when there is a dualistic system. EEA
legislation seems to have direct effect and primacy over internal law of
MS.120 The cases from the EFTA Court; Sveinbjörnsdóttir121 it was held that
the nature of the EEA Agreement was an international treaty sui generic,
containing a distinct legal order of its own and the Karlsson,case,122 where
the court refers to the absence of recognition of direct affect for EEA rules,
but still recognize state liability, do not provide absolute answers to the
question of direct effect.
Art. 67 did not have direct effect, so Art. 40 has in principle, no direct effect
either, in the opinion of Hans Van den Hurk and Albert Theunissen. This
Article is however clear and unconditional and attributes rights to
individuals, thereby fulfilling the criteria for direct effect.123 Van Gerwen
holds that the common view is that EEA legislation has direct effect and
primacy over internal law of Member States.124 The question of direct effect
is much debated at the moment and remains unresolved.
5.4. The EEA-Agreement and State aid
Instrument against distortion of competition in the EEA Agreement is to be
found in Art. 61 of the EEA Treaty, which corresponds to Articles 87-89 EC
on State aids (former Articles 92-94), see chapter xxx, A fairly recent case
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from the EFTA Court will be discussed and recent ESA involvement in
Iceland regarding State aid.
5.4.1. Norway v. EFTA surveillance authority
In the case Norway v. EFTA Surveillance Authority125, the issue was a
differentiated employers social security contribution, which was found to be
incompatible with the prohibition in Art. 61 of the EEA Agreement. At the
relevant time, Norway had a social security system, where the contributions
varied from zero to over 14%, depending on residency i various parts of
Norway. This system was designed to benefit business in certain
disadvantaged areas. The Norwegian Government claimed that the system
was a part of the general tax system in Norway and that it was sufficiently
general in nature as not to involve State aid.126
The Court first  noted that, as a general rule, a tax system of an EEA/EFTA
State was not covered by the EEA Agreement. Then the Court said that in
certain cases, however, such a system might have consequences that would
bring it within the scope of applications of Art. 61(1) EEA. The ECJ stated
furthermore, that it was established case law of the ECJ that the fiscal nature
of a measure did not shield it from the application of Art. 92 EC (now Art.
87 EC), nor did Art. 92 EC distinguish between the measures of State
intervention by reference to their causes and aims but rather defined them in
relation to their effects.  The Court said that in referring to “any aid granted
by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form
whatsoever, Art. 61(1) was directed at all aid financed form of public
resources and that such measures, favoring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods, might thus fall within the scope of Art. 61(1)
EEA”.
Although Art. 61 of the EEA Treaty concerns State aid, here the general
discussions on the scope of the EEA Treaty is important.127
ESA guidelines on the application of State aid rules to tax measures in
member states, that were adopted on June 30th 1999, are identical to the
guidelines set out by the Commission. 128
5.4.2. Recent ESA involvement in Iceland
There are two recent cases of ESA involvement in Iceland worth
mentioning, comprising State aid. The former, involving Air Iceland, has
already been resolved, but the latter has just started its process. These cases
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are relevant in the discussion of harmful taxation from an Icelandic
Perspective as they touch upon the independence of the Icelandic authorities
in matters of national importance.
The former case concerns a proposed aid to Air Iceland (Flugfélag Íslands),
amounting to ISK 31,5 million (approx. 380.000 euros), as a compensation
for the operation of air services between Reykjavík and Höfn (a town in the
Eastern part of Iceland) for a limited period of time. A contract comprising
the aforementioned aid was entered into by the Icelandic authorities
following the announcement of Air Iceland to cancel scheduled air services
between the two places mentioned above, as the services on that route were
no longer commercially viable. The duration of the contract is limited until a
new air carrier will be selected under a formal tender procedure. The EFTA
Surveillance Authority decided not to raise objections to the proposed aid,
as stated in a press release 22nd of May, 2002. The reasons for the decision
were among other that the Icelandic Government demonstrated full
compliance with the tender formalities as laid down in Art. 4 of Regulation
No 2408/92, as well as showing that the measures did not go beyond what is
necessary. 129
In the latter case, the Icelandic Minister for Finance, acting for the
Government of Iceland, was authorized, for the purpose of promoting the
development of high-tech industry in drug development in Iceland, to
provide a guarantee of collection in respect of a bond issue by the parent
company of Íslensk erfðagreining ehf., deCODE Genetics Inc, in an amount
of up to USD 200 million, to finance new activities of the company.
According to Art. 1(3) of Protocol 3 of the Surveillance and Court
Agreement, a notification was made. A possible justification of the
compatibility of the aid measure is to be found in Art. 61(3)(c) of the EEA
Agreement.130 A notification on State aid according to Art. 1(3) of the
Protocol of the Surveillance and Court Agreement, was only sent on the
27th of May 2002, so the ESA´s decision has not been made. The Icelandic
state considers the aid measure a legitimate State aid for Research and
Development within the meaning of Art. 61 of the EEA Agreement.
5.5. New issues – gray areas
There are a number of areas of Norwegian domestic tax law, where a
differentiation is made on the basis of residence and could be in conflict
with the fundamental freedoms131.132 In the area of taxation, there are
always new issues and gray areas, to be determined by the lawmakers and/or
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the Courts. Two such issues to be mentioned are on one hand the Baars-
case, which regards free movement of capital and on the other, the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive. These issues are put forward as questions, but no
solutions are provided.
5.5.1. The Baars-case
In the case of Baars,133 an entrepreneur Mr. Baars, who was a resident in the
Netherlands and owned a substantial part of shares in a company (Ballyard)
established in Ireland. Mr. Baars filed his declaration of capital wealth tax
where he stated that value of his shares in Ballyard and claimed the
exemption of company capital in the capital wealth tax. The tax inspector in
charge of the declaration refused the exemption, not because the
participation did not meet the condition of a substantial participation
according to the Dutch tax law, but on the grounds that the company,
Ballyard, was not established in the Netherlands and therefore did not meet
the condition of Art. 7, para. 3(c) of the Act on capital wealth tax 1964. Mr.
Baars turned to the national court in Hague, arguing among other that the
restriction of the exemption to shares to companies established in the
Netherlands, was contrary to Art. 52 (now Art. 43) and to Art. 73B (now
Art. 58)  of the EEC Treaty. Two questions were posed to the ECJ, in
essence asking whether Articles 6 and 52 of the EC Treaty were opposed to
the denial of the exemption of capital, based on the agreement that the
company in question was not established in the Netherlands. The ECJ came
to the conclusion that the denial was contrary to Art. 43 (formerly Art. 52)
of the EEC Treaty. The judgment has the effect, that when an entrepreneur
falls within the scope of Art. 43, the Netherlands have to apply the
exemption also to capital invested in companies established outside the
Netherlands.
The question arises whether this conclusion would be different, if the capital
was invested in shares in an EFTA state? Art. 31 of the EEA Treaty is
phrased the same as Art. 43 of the EC Treaty, and both Articles have direct
effect and the obvious conclusion is that capital invested in companies in
EFTA countries, has to be facilitated. 134
5.5.2. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive
As has already been discussed, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive is not
included in the EEA Treaty and no cooperation has been realized on that
issue of taxation.
A fictious example of a European concern with a holding company in the
Netherlands and a subsidiary in Belgium and Iceland is created by Hans van
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den Hurk and Albert Theunissen, in their Article; Several institutional and
fiscal aspects of the European Economic Area. This example is highly
relevant in this discussion on Iceland as a player in tax competition and it
will therefore be presented carefully, as a piece in our puzzle.
On the basis of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, it is allowed to distribute
profits to a holding company within the European Union, without
impediment of discrimination. This would have the effect, that the state
where the subsidiary was established, could not levy withholding taxes on
the distributed profit of the subsidiaries, unless it had been permitted to the
parent company to deduct the part of the tax levied of the subsidiary with
regard to this profit and to deduct the withholding tax levied with the
subsidiary.
Figure 2,135
When a subsidiary is established in an EEA country, this does not have to be
the case, as it is possible that state where the holding company is established
levies taxes in this case or that the state where the subsidiary is established
levies withholding taxes. In both examples, there is a difference in treatment
compared to an internal EU situation.
The Netherlands grants exemption when the conditions in the Directive are
met. If the subsidiary in Iceland is a capital investment, then the Article
regarding exemption of the Act on corporate income tax 1969136 is
applicable. If the subsidiary in Iceland was established in Ireland, then the
Netherlands would have applied the exemption on a different exemption
grounds in the same Act. The difference entails a less advantageous
treatment of the EFTA company in comparison with the EU company,
constituting a violation of the fundamental freedoms?
The authors of this example, Hans van den Hurk and Albert Theunissen see
only one justification of this fictious infringement and that is if the ECJ or
the EFTA Court would find, that the EEA Treaty was a pure trade
agreement, not nearly as far reaching as the EU Treaty. The authors believe
that this is not a likely judgment and I absolutely agree with them on that
conclusion.
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The example concerns cross-border economic activity and therefore it is
safe to say that the EEA Treaty is applicable. The parent company would be
impeded in its freedom to choose a place of establishment of the subsidiary.
An investment in an EU state would be more advantageous than a similar
investment in an EFTA state, the difference being the place of
establishment, within the internal market.
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6. Taxation Policy in the EU
Most of the areas relating to harmful taxation from an Icelandic perspective
should now be in place. The development is fast in these times of
globalization and technological revolution and each player has to try and
establish what is competitor is up to. In this chapter, the latest development
in the area of taxation policy within the European Union will be discussed,
focusing on tax competition.
6.1 Tax co-ordination in the EU
As Europe has moved increasingly to a Single Market, companies have had
to organize their operation on a European scale. However, the Community
has been comparatively successful at eliminating non-tariff barriers to cross-
border trade, the legal and tax structures have not caught up with the market.
A European corporation should be a longer-term option for companies that
operate on a pan-European scale. The removal of the unanimity requirement
for some aspects of taxation would facilitate this.137 For the present,
according to Art. 95(2), fiscal provisions are excluded from the qualified
majority voting procedure, giving the MS freedom to veto harmonization
proposals in the Council.
There is general agreement that unanimity will be retained for tax rates, in
the foreseeable future. However, the position is less clear in the case of
features equivalent to tax rates, such as effective rates of tax being
considerably lower than nominal headline rates, due to complexity of
corporate taxation. 138
At the Intergovernmental Conference in Nice139, the Commission tried to
seek agreement on approval of proposals on those tax matters that are
deemed vital for the functioning of the Single Market, through qualified
majority, but failed. The Commission has therefore been focusing on
alternative ways for making a progress toward reducing cross-border tax
obstacles.140
The European Commission thus presented a Communication on company
taxation and under the Belgian presidency, during the second half of 2001,
this was one of the their priorities.141 The Communication was from the
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and
Social Committee, on the subject; Towards an Internal Market without tax
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obstacles. The starting point of the Communication is a statement, where
reform of EU company taxation is said to be crucial for achieving the
Lisbon-goals142. The so-called Lisbon-goals comprise for the European
Union to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy in the world.143
The European Commission’s report on “Company Taxation in the Internal
Market144comprises four alternative comprehensive models. Model I is the
Home state Taxation, where taxable profits originating form affiliates of
MNEs in other MS would be determined and computed according to the tax
code of the home state of the parent company. Model II is the Common
(Consolidated) Tax Base, where MNEs would be imposed on consolidated
net profits of the units that operate within the European Union. Model III
proposes a common consolidated tax base, with a single rate determined at
the EU level. Model IV would substitute the existing 15 corporate tax
systems by a single one to be applied by all enterprises within the EU.
Models II, III and IV do in fact involve the drafting of a new tax code at the
EU  level whereas Model I is based on mutual recognition. 145
In a speech by the European Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, that he calls
Taxation Policy in the European Union which he delivered at the Institute of
European Affairs, in Ireland 29 May 2001, he declared among other that the
intermediate zone of direct taxation of mobile tax bases, in particular the
taxation of companies and the taxation of financial capital might have direct
effects on the Internal Market. Bolkestein said, that it should be stressed that
the Commission had no intention of harmonizing company tax rates but
rather that tax competition might encourage Member States to streamline
their public expenditure as well as it obliged governments to offer the best
possible services at the lowest possible price. Furthermore, Bolkestein said,
that tax competition could become harmful when it undermined the capacity
of MS  to finance essential public services, when enterprises and individuals
arrange their affairs so as to benefit from low-tax jurisdictions for taxation
purposes and high tax jurisdictions for the purposes of receiving public
services. The proposed way to tackle this was to promote a co-ordination of
Member State tax policies – by encouraging and facilitating co-operation. 
6.2. Arguments for/against co-ordination/tax competition.
 
The main arguments pro and con tax competition versus tax co-ordination
are featured in the following table.
                                                
142 This objective was first established at the European Council in Lisbon in March 2000
and reitered by the Stockholm European Council in March 2001.
143 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the
Economic and Social Committee, p. 3.
144 Released on 23 October 2001
145 Plasschaert, S. R.F., Comprehensive Approaches to EU Company Taxation: To Which
Companies Should They Apply?  p. 7 -11
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 Table 2146
“Arguments for
co-ordination/against competition
Arguments for competition/
against co-ordination
With the disappearance of risks based on
currency fluctuations, the differences in tax
systems have become clearer, and have a
greater impact on capital flows. Capital
allocations will be distorted if it takes place
solely for tax efficiency.
Competition takes place, not between tax
systems in isolation, but between
revenue/expenditure systems as a whole.
Countries with relatively high taxation – for
example in Scandinavia – remain
competitive by offering attractive social and
other factors.
Tax competition will result in a “race to the
bottom”, eroding Member States´ tax bases
Tax competition has not, in fact, resulted in
a fall in the proportion of GDP taken in tax:
rather the opposite.
There is an imbalance between the lack of
co-ordination on tax on the one hand; and,
on the other, the centralization of monetary
policy within the € area, together with
tightly constrained budgetary policy.
Since national governments within the € area
have lost the ability to change interest rates,
exchange rates or monetary aggregates, the
only instruments left to them for
stabilization policies is freedom to vary
taxes.
Welfare maximation through competition
only works when both capital and labor can
move between competing jurisdictions.
Where one factor (capital) is mobile, but
another (labor) is not, the tax system will be
distorted. Tax competition is increasing the
tax burden on labor, which increases the rate
of unemployment.
The gains from co-operation are not
necessarily shared equally between
participants. Lower taxes are one of the
mechanisms through which relatively poor
and/or small economies can compete in
attracting investment (e.g. Ireland). Tax co-
operation may therefore be merely an
attempt by richer/larger economies to protect
their revenues.
Tax competition makes it extremely difficult
to pursue social and environmental
objectives through the tax system: for
example, income redistribution, the taxation
of pollution, etc. Only co-ordination will
prevent “free-loading”.
The desired mix of taxation/public
expenditure may not be the same in all
economies. Devolved decisions on tax are
therefore more likely to correspond to
citizens´ preferences. Tax competition is in
accordance with the principles both of
subsidiarity and democracy.
Business has to deal with fifteen different
tax systems and fifteen different tax
authorities within the EU, causing
considerable costs and distortions.
“There is no art which one nation more
swiftly learns of another than that of
draining money from the pockets of the
people”. (Adam Smith)
                                                
146Tax – cordination in Europe, p. 77
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7. Analysis: Harmful taxation,
from an Icelandic perspective
This final chapter concludes this discussion on harmful taxation from an
Icelandic perspective. The main question posed was whether Iceland is
completely independent in relation to its own tax system, without any regard
to its participation in the European Economic Area. Tax law does not in
principle make up part of the EEA Treaty. However, as has been shown,
there are consequences that arise on the basis of the fundamental freedoms
and State aid - this also applies with regard to the autonomy of tax law of
the EEA Member States.
7.1. Different objectives
There is a difference of objectives of the EEA compared to those of the EU.
The European Union strives for an internal market, but the EEA aims at free
trade on the basis of the fundamental freedoms. The question therefore
arises whether this difference allows the fundamental freedoms in the EEA,
as in the EU, to restrict the autonomy of tax law? Hans van den Hurk and
Albert Theunissen maintain, that this difference in objectives cannot be
ignored. They believe that the scope to infringe, on the basis of the
fundamental freedoms, the autonomy of tax law is less far reaching than on
the basis of non-discrimination provisions in the EC Treaty.
As mentioned in the beginning, Iceland has become a player in the global
tax competition by lowering the corporate tax rates. Ireland has been an
active tax competitor for over twenty years, with a very beneficial effect on
the economy in Ireland. A short overview follows of the development in
Ireland and the measures they have taken in the area of taxation.
7.2. Ireland – a comparison
The Member States´ interest is that the citizens of the Union and
businesses from other countries place capital and function in their own?
country. Ireland is a good example on this. Through special rules in their
legal system, it is now considered attractive for businesses within the
financial sector to establish themselves in Ireland. And with a tax on
companies only 10%, it was clearly indicated that Ireland was a good
country to place certain businesses in.147
This temporary 10% tax rate for certain manufacturing companies was
introduced in Ireland over 20 years ago, before the advent of the Internal
                                                
147 EU-Boken, En handbok för företag om skatter och moms, Jan-Åke Jernhem, Jan-Olof
Johansson & Ulf Svensson, p. 79.
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Market, when the rate applicable to other sectors was 45%. At that time the
Commission raised no objection under State aid rules but later, after the
scheme had been extended, the Commission became concerned. In 1998 the
Commission concluded that it did now represent State aid because it was
sectoral and applied only to manufacturing activities. Not only did the
scheme fall foul of the State aid regulations but also, it was subsequently
found to be harmful under the Code of Conduct because it applied a lower
rate of tax to certain categories of activity148.
Ireland in response reduced its corporation tax for companies from 24% to
12,5%, effective 1. January 2003.149 By 2003 the general statutory tax rate
will be 12.5%. Instead of one sector relying on State aid under a harmful
scheme the whole Irish economy will now benefit from what, by
comparison with the rest of the EU is a ‘low’ rate of company taxation.
However, ‘the setting of the general statutory corporation tax is a matter for
individual Member States. Although this is subject to the obligation to
comply with Community law, the Commission does not consider that the
‘low’ general statutory corporation tax rate in Ireland infringes these.150 
As the Code of Conduct does not cover this low corporation tax, since
the Code only covers tax measures that provide for significantly lower,
level of taxation than the level that generally applies in the MS in question.
The new corporate tax system (to be implemented in January 2003), is thus
not to be labeled harmful according to the Code of Conduct, as it covers all
trading income derived by both resident and non-resident taxpayers and is
therefore not “special”.151 The new 12,5% rate is thus neither incompatible
with the Code of Conduct nor the State aid rules. 152
The economy in Ireland has flourished in the last years, but the tax cuts
among other factors have caused inflation to rise. Due to that situation, a
decision was made by ECOFIN, to warn Ireland that it was not complying
with the stability pact, resulting in Council Opinion153 of February 12th
2001, a recommendation under Art. 99(4) of the Treaty was made. There are
really no sanctions that the Commission can use, other than political
pressure.
Given that Iceland is not participating in the monetary union the situation in
Ireland where the Code of Conduct does not apply to measures inducing tax
competition, but on the other hand a violation of the stability pact in
                                                
148 A speach by the European Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, at the Institiut of European
Affairs, in Dublin Ireland, 29. May 2001.
149 Budget 2000, http://revenue.is/wnew/corp00.htm
150 A speach by the European Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, at the Institiut of European
Affairs, in Dublin Ireland, 29. May 2001.
151 Pinto, C., EU and OECD to Fight Harmful Tax Competition; Has the Right Path Been
Undertaken? International Tax Review, Intertax, Volume 26, Issue 12, P. 393
152 Svalborn, O., Ireland and the Evolution of Tax Competition, p. 14.
153 Council Opinion, February 12th 2001, on the 2000 update of Ireland’s stability
programme, 2001-2003 (2001/C 77/07)
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connection with the monetary union can cause political pressure, there could
be indirect beneficial effects on Iceland its newly entered competition for
attracting footloose investment.
7.3.  Co-ordination
In European tax policy, it has been a general rule that national sovereignty
takes precedence, as MS want to decide themselves how to structure their
tax systems. Despite the emphasis on sovereignty, the European tax system
is nevertheless undergoing changes and arguments for taking action in  a
European context are being heard more often. Coordinated European action
is needed in areas such as cross-border problems, as it can reduce the
competitiveness of one MS in comparison with another MS. Also
coordinated action is needed to remove obstacles as differences between the
tax systems of MS that can hinder the efficient operation of the Internal
market.154 A harmonized tax rate within the European Union is not a likely
solution, given the development in recent years.
Member States of the EU have furthermore begun amendments on tax
legislation. Close examples are the  amendments on the tax legislation in
Sweden where foreign companies within the EEA were enabled in some
cases to be treated under the same conditions as Swedish. The reasons were
among others those, that it was important that tax legislation did not put
unnecessary burdens on groups of companies involved in cross-border
activities and also that it was important for Sweden to appear as an attractive
country for foreign investments.155 Such measures do not only make
Sweden more attractive to foreign investment, but it may also be concluded
that such measures facilitate for establishment of subsidiaries in Iceland.
7.4. The Code of Conduct – does it effect
Iceland?
The Code of Conduct is a political commitment, entered into by the MS,
enforced by peer pressure. A spill-over effect from the Code into the
internal taxation of an EEA state is highly unlikely indeed.
Her vantar eitthvad
Enlargement of the European Union is in progress. Accession negotiations
have started with six countries156 and accession negotiations have been
                                                
154 Bos, W. J., The Changing World of European Tax Policy, European taxation, September
2000, p. 409-411
155 Bergström, S., Bruzelius, A, Home-State Restrictions on the Freedom of Establishment
in a Swedish Income Tax Law Perspective, p. 238.
156 The Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.
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launched with six additional candidate countries.157 The challenge with the
adoption and implementation of the taxation acquis of the European Union
is much greater, as the participants in the last enlargement had been
members of the European Economic Area with highly developed economies
and has already taken on large parts of the acquis.158
The candidate countries have been reminded, that the Code of Conduct for
Business Taxation, is a part of the tax acquis, even if it is not a legal
obligation but a political commitment. In most candidate countries, there
has been some kind of preferential company taxation, for example offshore
centers or economic free zones. The candidate countries have provided
information, permitting an assessment on the compatibility of their tax
systems with the general principles of the Treaty, such as the freedom of
establishment and non-discrimination. The candidate countries have been
invited to confirm that they are prepared to only introduce new tax
measures, which are in line with the Code of Conduct, similar to the
“standstill” presently applied by the MS.159
In my opinion the Code of Conduct does thus affect Iceland. The
implication of this statement is not the Code is applicable by itself as an
instrument to control the tax legislation in Iceland. Quite the opposite, the
Code of Conduct is not applicable in any way in Iceland, but the restraints
that it puts on taxation policy on the Member States, must have the effect of
strengthening Iceland’s position as a serious tax competitor. The conclusion
is that a corporate-friendly tax rate, a membership in the Internal Market,
without the pressure of the Code of Conduct rules and the Monetary Union
gives Iceland a good position in European tax competition.
7.5. Iceland – a good or harmful tax competitor
Good tax competition can have beneficial effect by forcing governments to
maintain low levels of expenditure and by changing the tax structure to
achieve fairness. Where the goal is primarily to attract foreign direct
investments, this can result in harmful tax competition by for example
reducing a corporate tax rate applicable on income earned by foreign
investors, possibly leading to the ultimate erosion of the taxable base. But
when the corporate tax rate is reduced on income earned by ALL investors,
national or foreign, such measures do not constitute harmful taxation.
                                                
157 Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and the Slovak Republic.
158 Birk Jacobsen, S, Enlargement of the European Union – taxation, Editorial, EC Tax
Review, 2000-4. P. 216.
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